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SOME MANAGERIAL ASPECTS OF COMMAND

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAROLD R. LAMP, USA

(How can the commander "manage"
intangibles such a s motivation, tradition,
teamwork, and self-confidence? What role
does the chain of command play in the
command/management relationship?)

In m y command, the task of
man-management is given a higher
priority than skill at anns or professional
ability.
-Lieutenant General Sir John Mogg
Kermit Roosevelt Lecture, 1969
A farseeing Army needs to digress now and
then in assessing its performances to make
certain that it is recording the lessons which
have great impact for the future. In time of
war, analysis of the critical battlefield
understandably dominates military writing,
but it cannot be permitted to hide other great
lessons. In the past half-decade, the
Vietnamese battle has done just that. The
feedback, critique, and assimilation of other
important if less spectacular teachings have
been dwarfed.
A prime current example is the lack of
professional discussion of unit commanders'
management roles in what possibly has been a
major accomplishment of the US Army,
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Lieutenant General Sir John Mogg of the
British Army believes in assigning top
priority to the matter of "man-management."

especially in the past five years: the ways and
m e a n s o f m a n i p u l a t i n g military
resources- expanding, contracting, and
trading off-in responding to US national
security requirements. While the subject has
been amply covered at the Department of
Defense and budget level, not nearly enough
attention has been given to documenting,
analyzing, and assimilating the management
experiences subordinate to centralized
decisions of the defense establishment as a
whole. Valuable lessons are waiting to be
rediscovered in the next expanding crisis of
military consequence.
Two precedents related to the Vietnam
buildup illustrate this point: (a) The
expansion of forces without any significant
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The systems analysis approach to centralized
management may well remain as the genius of
defense management in the 1970s. These
c o n t r o l s will b e accompanied by
ever-increasing inquiries into current
practices-penetration of military command
functions- while searching f o r new
efficiencies and dollar economies, or to
support a politically-preferred change.

call-up of the reserve training base, and (b)
the costing of manpower along with other
resources in determining battlefield means.
Both reordered past planning exercises and
are procedures now established as possible
ways of instituting future force level changes.
Consequently, in order to be certain that the
end results did in fact justify the means there
is a great need to trace the effects of these
techniques and associated trade-offs from top
to bottom.
By quick assessment, the US Army's
manipulation of its limited resources in
accomplishing the Vietnam buildup appears as
a miracle of management. However, the
attendant bartering permeated all levels of
command and required some "robbing of
Peter to pay Paul." The current lack of
understanding with regard to subordinate
management procedures and problems
precludes a positive guarantee that the
"miracle" label will hold for the military
historian. To an unknown degree, some of the
trade-offs have had an adverse impact on the
Army. Critical analysis and assessment of the
residual effects of worldwide personnel
turbulence and training shortfall-beyond that
recorded numerically in unit readiness
reports-are needed before mobilization plans
and programs can be updated with any
exactitude.
The evolved management style guides from
the top the decisions of Vietnam and has its
own dynamic "snowballing centralization of
decisionmaking"1 which does not pause long
for critique before continuing on its course.
The same management logic is being used in
developing trade-offs for the
"Vietnamization" of the war and in reducing
selected worldwide US forces during the
switching of national priorities and dollars
from Vietnam to domestic affairs.
The essential military lesson is that the US
Army is now living with but has not yet fully
adapted to the new management technique.
Cost effective controls which have partly
dictated both the mobilization strategy and
battlefield tactics of Vietnam are now wedded
to the military. Not only are these controls
bound to the Army in a dollars and cents
fashion, but also in terms of domestic politics.

ASSAYING SOLDIER INTANGIBLES

A current example of a combined political
and economic "effectiveness" analysis is the
search f o r a "happier" system for
procurement of military manpower, one that
is at once not overly expensive and yet more
palatable to the public than the present draft.
In April 1970, President Nixon announced to
Congress some proposals designed to move
toward a zero draft by 1973. But in the same
message he qualified his objective by
indicating that "no one can predict with
precision whether or not-or precisely
when-we can end conscription."2 Some
military spokesmen3 have opposed the "all
volunteer" approach, contending among other
things that the draft provides the Army with
necessary civil ties to all segments of society.
But, indicative of the facts of life in the
modern defense management style, more and
more political and military spokesmen are
giving their support to the volunteer plan. The
measurable e c o n o m i c and political
costs-not debatable intangibles unadapted
to comparative cost analyses-are the factors
likely to be persuasive in the budget decisions
of defense management.
Hence, in addition to the Army's need for a
better in-house assessment of the full impact
of past centralized defense management
decisions, an even greater need exists to be
ready for further "systems analysis" probes
concerning the worth and requirements for
other as yet unexamined practices traditional
to military management.
The obvious target for these queries was
pointed out by General Westmoreland: "With
over a half of the Army's annual budget being
spent on military and civilian personnel costs,
efficient use of personnel offers a lucrative
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to: How much training is enough? He must
know how to establish a military "standard."
The "standard" for Vietnam seems to have
settled on eight weeks basic individual
training, nine weeks advanced individual
training (ten weeks in an experimental
program at Fort McClellan),6 plus "up to 10
days in-unit training"7 after arrival in
Vietnam. Taken at face value, the Army's
standards are met largely by time and subject
completions, which in turn are balanced to
the aptitudes near to the learning base of new
recruits and draftees; it sometimes seems that
proficiency tends to be measured more by
attendance than by quality of performance.
Approached indirectly, a quality soldier-a
quality unit-has (1) skills and (2) mental
"confidences" attuned always t o missions, in
common or passed from above. The requisite
skills are acquired in a number of ways, the
teacher-pupil relationship being obviously
common, but self-teaching and induced
learning being substantial contributors
nonetheless.
The building of the mental "confidences"
is the much more elusive requirement of
training, but in developing quality soldiers it
is equal in importance to the acquisition of
basic i n d o c t r i n a t i o n skills. Requisite
"confidences" and attitudes are by no means
certain in either the professional soldier or the
recruit, but they are likely to be stable only
for the older soldier.
The quality attributes are interrelated. Skill
and confidence each cross-reinforce the
development of the other. Motivation, for
example, is the near universal ingredient to
t h e building o f b o t h "skills" and
"confidences." But induced acquisition of
both, either in, a positive or negative sense, is
also likely, and is underrated in its
importance.
Development of fighting skills is related to
military training experiences. The building of
essential "confidences" is not confined to
active duty experience and is no more likely
to be developed in the military classroom
than in the mess hall or on leave. Leadership
more than the instructor contributes t o
confidence-building unless they are one and
the same; team efforts contribute even more
than the commander.

US Army

The Army Chief of Staff,
General William C. Westmoreland, has called
attention to the role that management can play in
solving the Army's problems during the next decade.

area for economy ."5 This information must
be sought at all levels, recording why
command, management, and leadership
techniques d o or do not work, to include
developing means for gauging the quality of
the operational or training result.
WHEN IS A SOLDIER TRAINED?
HOW MUCH TRAINING IS ENOUGH?

Centralized decisionmakers, like audit
agencies, address themselves to monied
c o n c e p t s a n d quantity measurements,
accounting more for dollars, spaces, time, and
hardware t h a n f o r overall s y s t e m
requirements and results. The "quality"
considerations are adapted to simple "go" or
"no go" standards. In the 1970s, in order to
influence the decisionmakers, Army training
managers will be required to adapt to money
and quantity measurements to answer the
question: When is a soldier trained? The
training manager must also know the answer
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The standard for quality must focus on the
professional. For example, the "snappy
salute" from the citizen-soldier is not quite so
important as is his "hitting the simulated
combat target." On the other hand, the
professional m u s t d o both- do all
things- equally well. Otherwise, the
"confidences" of the professional in his own
abilities and those of his unit will diminish;
leadership must recognize and genuinely
adapt to both standards, found side-by-side in
US Army units.
In general, the training of soldiers is
decentralized to the lower levels of
competence-which changes depending upon
the availability of instructor resources. The
really professional unit conducts its own
training; the weaker unit seeks a committee
solution. But, as mentioned previously, the
learning of skills is but half a loaf; acquisition
of "confidences" is the other half of quality
soldiering. The latter is tied to the unit and
the chain of command, not to the instructor
pool as such.
To build from an earlier point, the teaching
of military skills can be regimented to
instructional schedules, but "learning" and
acquiring positive or negative "confidences"
and "attitudes" cannot. Further, this
acquisition cannot be confined to active duty
experience o n l y ; however, the best
opportunities for active duty influence come
with positive leadership and identity with the
unit team.
Except for the general propensity to
decentralize training to the lower levels of
competence, there is not enough emphasis in
c u r r e n t training documents on the
a c q u i s i t i o n - h a l f of q u a l i t y soldier
development. In effect, this amounts to
managing o n l y part of the training
requirement.
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Figure 1. The principles of instruction.

MANAGEMENT OF MOTIVATION

Motivating the recruit and the draftee
citizen-soldier to give a quality performance is
entirely different than nurturing the same
spirit in the professional soldier. Army
training in the United States since World War
I has been geared to mass production training
of the citizen-soldier.

A lot of learning, good as well as bad, takes
place under the surface. Little of this training
is planned or even acknowledged in current
training management procedures.
The theoretical limit for full capacity unit
training is the absolute capability either to
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Figure 2. The training arch.

learn or to teach, whichever is the smaller.
The likelihood of approaching either limit is
pure fantasy; the real world lives down near
the bottom rung of the theoretical ladder.
T h e p o t e n t i a l f o r u n i t training
accomplishment is an interrelated function of
both the learning and teaching capacities. At
present, training management tends to
underscore the latter.
Actually, learning may well be the more
important first step. The truism that learning
is assimilated more quickly on the battlefield
is obviously due to motivation. Nevertheless,
training policy has continued to emphasize
management of instructional resources; not
the motivational aspects of learning-the
receptivity to instruction and retention of
realistic training experience. The lesson yet to
be learned-inherently obvious in the combat
zone-is that inducements to learning (short
of combat experience) seldom receive their
due, and are not now a conscious part of
training management.

The total Army environment and not just
"the combat" part may be the key to greater
efficiencies in training. What besides a
shooting war motivates the soldier to learn?
This is an everyday command management
question.
A deeper look at the Army's training
management guidance as outlined in Army
Regulation 350-1, Army Training, and Field
Manual 21-5, Military Training Management,
indicates recognition of broader principles.
For example:
Effective training depends on effective
leadership, proper organization and
sufficient repetition to assure acquisition
and retention of desired knowledge and
skills. (AR 350-1)

and:
The Army training structure consists of
the total environment in which a soldier
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develops the knowledge and skills
required to accomplish his assigned
duties. (FM 21-5)
The total impact of this guidance is that
training is a decentralized responsibility which
passes requirements for training to the lower
l e v e l s o f i n s t r u c t o r competence.
Theoretically, such guidance tends t o ignore
the fact that the individual instructor can do
little to "unteach" a poor attitude acquired
outside his unit.
Current training literature addresses the
"motivation" of troops, but dwells on
teaching; the instructor is called the
"keystone of the training arch" (Figures 1
and 2 adapted from Field Manual 21-6,
Techniques of Instruction). Perhaps the
instructor is not the keystone, perhaps it is
motivation that acts as the keystone and
cement between teaching and learning.
Leadership and teamwork-possibly esprit
de corps-are the generators of inducements
to learning; they are not confined to the
classroom, and most certainly not to a
training schedule. Both are related t o doing
things together, successfully, and can sink to
negative values whenever failures occur. Few
would deny that there is an interrelation
b e t w e e n u n i t r e p u t a t i o n a n d unit
accomplishment, that "the good unit does all
things well."
The point is more easily made by looking
at the other side of the problem. A
"confident performance" subsequent to a
combat failure-or training failure requiring
retraining-is unlikely, and eliminates much
possibility for an expanded performance or
new initiative before restoring a winning
record and attitude. Generally, it is difficult
for a unit to pick itself up from a major
failure and go on to an inspired performance.
A negative environment or experience stifle
initiative at the expense of unit motivation,
leadership, teamwork, and esprit. Objectives
are minimal, and unit reward is relief rather
than expanded accomplishment.
Unit leadership and teamwork can often be
enhanced by organizing training to take
advantage of and to strengthen the chain of
command. For example, classroom seating
according to crew or squad composition

offers the potential for role-playing by small
unit teams. In this manner, additional
instructional benefits are realized during the
teaching of subjects such as crew training or
small unit tactics.*
The supposition here is that a considerably
greater part of Army training now directed to
the individual should instead be addressed to
the small unit team. Such direction would
take advantage of the intra-team instructional
potential and the benefits associated with the
concurrent exercise of the chain of command.
The subordinate leader's ability t o control his
group is almost certain to be strengthened, as
is the indirect benefit of team-directed
training. But, the full benefits are likely to
appear only if they are planned.
Motivating a short-term soldier to turn in a
professional performance is entirely different
from motivating the same level of
accomplishment in the veteran performer. In
the training base there has been a wide
variance in training practices, and a marked
stretching of professional leadership brought
about by the requirements of Vietnam.
Nevertheless, a conservative observation is
that basic training improved in the course of
the Vietnam buildup, and is probably better
now than at any time in the past. Further,
unit training conducted by inexperienced
junior officers and NCOs did not sink to a level
that might reasonably have been forecast.**
*On the other hand, the same seating arrangement
can detract from individual learning of non-team
subjects wherein the individual's separate views and
participation are desired. If arranged by unit teams
for this type of training, the soldier may tend to look
to the established team for a group reaction rather
than participating freely. General subjects such as
military justice, code of conduct, and troop
information classes would seem to fall in the
"non-team" category.
**For example, the drawdown of US Army forces
in Europe challenged commanders there to meet the
same pre-drawdown mission requirements, but with
considerably less resources. The adverse impact on
mission readiness was apparent; still
the
demonstrated abilities-some of the impressive
training accomplishments-would indicate that the
units there had somehow matched the requirement.
Units with few experienced officers and NCOs (and
rapid personnel turnarounds) were getting the job
done, not as smoothly as before but not nearly so
raggedly as comparative assets would indicate. The
jobs did not get smaller; men grew to fit the jobs.
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effective analysis a n d that military
c o m m a n d e r s t a k e n collectively have
shortcomings in this same area.
In general, Army leadership recognizes the
need for quickly acquiring these modern
management skills and is doing something
about it by modernizing Army schools and
organizations. At the same time, Army
leadership is continuing to make decisions of
the highest caliber; while these leaders may be
a bit uneasy because of their lack of modern
systems analysis skills, they continue to make
good command decisions. This seems to
suggest that: either (a) traditional techniques
and old-fashioned methods of military
analysis are not all that bad, or (b) a great
many skills and judgments of successful
command are not now adapted to systems
analysis management. There are elements of
truth in both statements.
Granted, "Management" and "Command"
are not the same. But this, at best, is a
short-term rejoinder for the military leader
who has demonstrated expertise as a good
commander, and is not now scrambling to
a c q u i r e t h e knowledge o f modern
m a n a g e m e n t t e c h n i q u e s . Heed o f
shortcomings must be taken now, for the
rejoinder may not apply in the future.
Nevertheless, there is value in addressing
the current differences between command
and management even while recognizing the
close relationship between the two, and the
equal applicability of modern techniques for
future systematic decision analysis. While
accepting these as essentials of future
command, it is likewise apparent that the
successful leadership skills evidenced by past
commanders, untrained in management
t e c h n i q u e s , are not in the slightest
discredited; further, that the analyst's
procedures to date have been mechanistic and
i n c o m p l e t e by comparison. It seems,
therefore, that experienced commanders, now
adapting to the centralized decisionmaking
process, may be capable of presenting totally
different bases for their accomplishments; of
i n s u r i n g t h a t in t h e process of
modernizing- merging c o m m a n d and
m a n a g e m e n t - t h e bases f o r t h o s e
accomplishments are not lost.

It does not seem possible that better
instructor performances could account for the
relative improvement in training, because
professional experience at the unit level
diminished noticeably in the process of
extending available resources to cover the
e x p a n d i n g requirements of Vietnam.
Therefore, the improvement is believed to be
attributable to the increased efforts of the
individual soldier.
It may be that the Vietnam buildup and
s h o o t i n g war environment motivated
improved soldier performance and enhanced
receptivity to training. The total situation
suggests, however, that the motivation was
not limited to Vietnam, and that total
environment contributes greatly to training
efficiencies, far more than any change in
instructor quality. Further, it may be that: (a)
motivation need not relate directly t o subjects
being taught, (b) factors considerably beyond
those now normally addressed in instructor
lesson plans may in fact contribute to the
training process, (c) the commander, not the
instructor, must play the major role in
motivating soldier reception and retention of
realistic training experiences, (d) the public
image relating to Army duty is a part of the
t o t a l Army- profession and
i n s t i t u t i o n - t r a i n i n g management and
leadership requirement, (e) the training
prerequisite to current and past US soldier
development is a much more flexible process
than current procedures allow, and (f)
training is a flexible commodity that bends to
requirements and therefore is both suitable
f o r a n d susceptible to cost effective
management.
Does a shooting war enhance a soldier's
learning? What else motivates the soldier to
learn? These questions are representative of
those associated with everyday, high-priority,
Army command management problems.
MILITARY PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT

Military commanders recognize the close
link between good command and good
management. They recognize that the
decisionmaker at the top in the Department
of Defense must rely on the tools of cost
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level we must find ways and means of
influencing the decisionmakers."8

There is a need for hard observations,
critiques, and value judgments by professional
men of all important military undertakings,
but it should receive equal emphasis at all
levels in the chain of command. In particular
this is needed for that part of command
management that is unique to military
leadership and effectiveness in the field. For it
is this aspect of defense management that the
d e c i s i o n m a k e r - t h e civilian s y s t e m s
analyst-does not now weigh in his centralized
m e a s u r e m e n t s o f m i l i t a r y command
effectiveness and requirements. And, finally,
it may be that this is the aspect of
management that the military profession-the
commander-has also taken for granted.
US Army

In 1968, General Ferdinand J. Chesarek
wrote of the Army's need for finding
ways of influencing the decisionmakers.
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I n t h e p a s t , A m e r i c a n s h a v e been
sometimes careless in assaying their military
resources-miserly in peacetime, extravagant
in war-believing, at least through the Korean
War, that whatever was available would be
enough. For a variety of reasons, however,
past wartime permissiveness and peacetime
optimism are now folly. This is true partly
because such practices are now prohibitively
costly, technologically unfathomable, and
politically intolerable, but mainly true
because it is just not good business in the
modern management sense. Centralized,
computerized, and "civilianized" defense
management is the rational result and " raises
a thorny issue, for it means that at the Army
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